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INSURANCE
W. Shelby McKenzie*
In the insurance field, there were several interesting
cases involving exclusions for intentional conduct in the lia-
bility coverage of homeowners' policies.1 In Kipp v. Hurdle,2
the court held that the insurer did not provide coverage for a
wife who assaulted and injured her husband's dancing part-
ner. The insured in Nettles v. Evans3 committed an assault on
a stranger in a shopping center parking lot while under the
influence of drugs and alcohol. The court held that there was
coverage, finding that the insurer had not carried its burden
of proving the insured had the capacity to intend his acts.
McBride v. Lyles 4 involved a fight at a basketball tournament
in which several students injured the plaintiff. The court held
there was coverage for the vicarious liability of the fathers of
the minor students because the fathers had not engaged in
any intentional misconduct. 5
Tillman v. Canal Insurance Co. 6 involved an accident
caused by gravel which earlier had spilled from the insured's
truck. The court was presented with the interesting issue
whether the negligence of the driver in leaving this un-
marked hazard in the highway was covered under the com-
prehensive general liability or the automobile liability cover-
* Special Lecturer in Law, Louisiana State University; Member, Baton
Rouge Bar.
1. The exclusion for intentional conduct may appear as a separate exclu-
sion or may be included in the policy definition of an "occurrence" for which
liability coverage is provided. Many policies define an "occurrence" as "an
accident . . . which results, during the policy term, in bodily injury or prop-
erty damage neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the in-
sured."
2. 307 So. 2d 125 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1975).
3. 303 So. 2d 306 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1974).
4. 303 So. 2d 795 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1974).
5. The court noted that public policy would prevent one from insuring
against his own intentional acts, but public policy does not forbid one to
insure against the intentional acts of another for which he is vicariously
liable. Id. at 799. The court pointed out that the conduct must be intentional
on the part of the particular insured claiming coverage. This holding is
consistent with the prior jurisprudence. See, e.g., Rivers v. Brown, 168 So. 2d
400 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1964), in which the court found coverage for L.T. Brown
Contractor, Inc. even though liability arose out of the intentional acts of L.T.
Brown, its president and principal stockholder.
6. 305 So. 2d 602 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 307 So. 2d 630 (La.
1975).
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age of the insured's policy.7 These separate coverages were
mutually exclusive, with the automobile part covering and
the general liability part excluding coverage for "use, includ-
ing loading and unloading," of automobiles. Applying a "com-
mon sense" approach, the court concluded that the accident
did not arise out of the "use" of the truck because there was
no connexity between the vehicle from which the gravel was
spilled and the intervening negligence of the driver in failing
to protect the motoring public. The court wisely rejected the
application of any artificial tests for "use," but reasonable
men may differ as to whether common sense dictated the
result reached by the court.8
7. Apparently, the applicable limits of liability were greater under the
comprehensive general liability coverage than under the automobile liability
part.
8. The "common sense" approach was first suggested in Speziale v.
Kohnke, 194 So. 2d 485 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967) and adopted by the Louisiana
Supreme Court in Fertitta v. Palmer, 252 La. 336, 211 So. 2d 282 (1968). Other
"use" cases of interest include Ramsey v. Continental Ins. Co., 286 So. 2d 371
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1973); Cagle v. Playland Amusement, Inc., 202 So. 2d 396 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1967); Baudin v. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co., 201 So. 2d 379 (La. App.
3d Cir. 1967); Bolton v. North River Ins. Co., 102 So. 2d 544 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1958); Spurlock v. Boyce-Harvey Machinery, Inc., 90 So. 2d 417 (La. App. 1st
Cir. 1956).
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